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Despite buoyant oil revenues, the Iranian economy is going through a difficult 
period. While its aggregate economic performance has improved over the 
last several years, there has been little progress made in alleviating poverty or 
unemployment. 
The emergence of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 signaled a shift towards a 
populist economic agenda designed to confront its long-standing economic 
malaise. Ahmadinejad's petro-populism condemns the size of the state and 
its bureaucracy, the budget's undue reliance on oil export income, wealth and 
income differentials, low wages, high unemployment, corruption, nepotism and 
monopolies. In his electiown campaign, he promised to "put the oil money on 
everyone's dinner table" by a distribution of "justice shares" to the masses and 
setting up special funds to offer no- or low-interest loans to young couples. 
Unfortunately, while attractive sounding, Ahmadinejad's petro-populism has 
featured frequent, hurried and uncoordinated state interventions in the market 
for goods, money and capital, along with the pursuit of expansionary monetary 
and fiscal policies. This approach does not augur well for a thriving economy 
in the rest of Ahmadinejad's term. These polides, if continued, are also bound 
to fail by a wide margin to deliver his promised 'just' Islamic society during his 
tenure. 
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Introduction 
When asked what he was going to do about rising 
rates of inflation, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 
replied, "This revolution is not about the price of 
watermelons." In another instance Khomeini noted 
that "some persons have come to me and said that 
now that the revolution is over, we must preserve 
our economic infrastructure. But our people rose 
for Islam, not for the economic infrastructure. "1 
The Soviets were communist, the Nazis had private 
ownership with state control, and Iran has heavily 
interventionist crony capitalism, plus an odd grab-
bag of specifically Islamic economic regulations 
... Everyone who makes serious money in Iran 
makes it because of a relationship with the state. 
- Anonymous Iranian businessman 
Ahmadinejad openly speaks of a "clash of 
civilizations" both inside Iran and in the world at 
large. He does not want a seat at a panel in Davos; 
his dream is to abolish the capitalist system that 
produced Davos. He does not want Iran to become 
a member of the World Trade Organization, which 
he has described as "a club of global thieves." Nor is 
he tempted by the offer of preferential trade relations 
with the European Union that he sees as "a family of 
fat parasites living off other nations. "2 
He (Ahmadinejad) has more integrity than other 
politicians, but he 1s an ideologue, and ideologues 
see the world simply 3 
The above quotes illustrate the sharp contrast in 
the way the Iranian Revolution has been perceived 
over the years. The charismatic populist Ayatollah 
Khomeini projected the notion that the Revolution was 
about more than economic gains, that social justice 
was its primary goal. However, many cynics note that 
after Khomeini's death all that really took place was a 
reshuffling of elites, with a somewhat unique brand of 
Islamic crony capitalism replacing the Shah's crony 
capitalism. 
Finally, the 2005 emergence of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
suggests populism is again on the ascendancy in 
Iran. Ahmadinejad rose to power advancing the 
proposition that the governments since Khomeini's 
neglected the principles of a true Islamic state. His 
populist message condemns the size of the state 
and its bureaucracy, the budget's undue reliance on 
oil export income, wealth and income differentials, 
low wages, high unemployment, corruption, 
nepotism and monopolies. In his election campaign, 
he promised to "put the oil money on everyone's 
dinner table" by a wholesale purification of the Oil 
Ministry, confiscation of government assets obtained 
through privatizations, distribution of "justice shares" 
to the masses and setting up special funds to offer 
no- or low-interest loans to young couples seeking 
employment, marriage and home ownership. 4 
While these are lofty and seemingly well-intended 
goals, difficult challenges confront Ahmadinejad. 5 
Data on the economy paint a gloomy picture. While 
aggregate economic performance has improved over 
the last several years following the dramatic increase 
in oil prices, the longer-run pattern is one of decline. 
At the time of the Revolution, Iran had an income 
equivalent to Spain's, pumped six million barrels of 
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oil a day, and nurtured a vibrant middle class. Today, 
Iran's real per capita income is considerably below 
what it was before the revolution, oil production is two-
thirds of the 1979 level, and the middle class is being 
squeezed by high inflation, chronic unemployment, 
and stagnant wages. 
The sections below examine the economic dynamics 
in Iran that has led to sub-optimal rates of growth 
combined with high levels of unemployment and 
mounting inflationary pressures. Within this context 
how does Ahmadinejad's populist agenda propose 
to improve the lives of those at the lower ends of 
the income scale? Specifically, what key principles 
underlie Iranian populism? What are the particular 
populist programs/measures that comprise the 
Ahmadinejad revolution? What is their likely efficacy 
in combating inflation, unemployment and poverty? 
A final section sketches the likely ramifications of 
Ahmadinejad's brash petro-populism agenda. 
1. Evolution of Iranian Petro-Populism 
It is possible to identify at least six distinct periods6 of 
economic policymaking since the Revolution - three 
periods of populism and ttiree of a more pragmatic 
approach towards the economy: 
1. The First Populist Phase, from 1979 to 
1981, included the wave of post-revolutionary 
nationalizations and confiscations of property from 
individuals associated with the Shah's regime; 
2. The Second Populist Phase lasted from 1982 
to 1984 and was marked by a shift from the 
more socialist-oriented policies of the first phase 
to strictly Islamic policies, such as interest-free 
banking, together with the dismantling of the 
Shah's indicative central planning system; 
3. The First Pragmatic Phase, 1985-89, saw 
no major innovations in economic policy, but, 
instead, a tentative opening to the outside world 
as attitudes towards the United States softened 
under pressures from the Iran-Iraq war, as well as 
a decline in real incomes. 
4. The Second Pragmatic Phase, 1989-1997, 
which coincided with Rafsanjani's presidency, 
was marked by the introduction of a five-year 
planning process still in effect today, some 
privatization of state enterprises, and attempts 
to integrate into the world economy that included 
obtaining a World Bank loan in 1993, although 
Islamic economics were maintained internally and 
support continued for the fundamentalist Islamic 
movements aboard. 
5. The Social Reform Phase began with the 
ascension of Mohammed Khatami to the 
presidency in 1997. His policies, opposed by the 
conservative ulama, emphasized the rule of law 
and a relaxation of control of political discussion 
and social customs by the ulama and the security 
forces, while maintaining an Islamic framework. 
Economically, Khatami sought to establish a new 
type of transition economy in Iran that would 
combine modernization and globalization with 
continued adherence to Islamic law codes and 
economic practices. Externally, Khatami continued 
Rafsanjani's efforts to open Iran to the world 
economy, and with more success. Internally. 
there was a consolidation of state control where 
it already existed and few changes in Islamic 
economic institutions or practices. 
6. The Third and Current Populist Phase began 
in 2004 when Islamic hard-liners gained control 
of parliament, culminating in the election of ultra-
conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadine1ad 
in the summer of 2005. This phase has shown 
little enthusiasm for building on the 2002 reforms. 
Instead, the tendency has been to revert to the 
general populist principles laid down by Ayatollah 
Khomeini in the immediate years after the 
Revolution. 
Given the country's vast oil resources, Khomeini's 
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populist approach had a somewhat unique mix 
of features. In addition to the usual populist focus 
on the redistribution of income, Khomeini's petro-
populism featured the establishment of para-
governmental organizations for charitable purposes, 
the overvaluation of the national currency, a restricted 
scope for private sector activities, and chronic budget 
deficits with corresponding inflationary pressures. 
While economic factors play an important role in 
Iranian populism, they are clearly subservient to social 
(and religious) considerations: 7 
Iran has a distinctive populist economic 
approach. Thus by Iranian populism, I mean a 
political authority that tried to gain legitimacy 
from mass society without really threatening 
the whole principle of private property. In a 
simple definition, it can be argued that the 
main characteristic of this version of populist 
economics is an approach to economics 
that emphasizes income redistribution, i.e. 
social justice, as an ideology. 
The emergence of Iranian populism also coincided 
with economic and political instability.8 
the effects of political instability on 
economic performance have led to the view 
that Iran is a discretionary state that lacks 
credibility rather than a protective state. The 
lack of credibility of the state excluded the 
private sector from its liquid resources and 
obliged it to retreat into informal relationships. 
Therefore, the levels of savings, investment 
and technology were lower under this 
unstable political authority (i.e. discretionary 
state) and as a consequence per capita 
income was lower. 9 
As might be expected, Iranian populism has had its 
greatest appeal to those groups who traditionally 
have been its main beneficiaries: (1) non-tradable 
goods sectors such as construction and services; (2) 
firms producing import substitutes; (3) farmers in rural 
areas, and (4) urban groups who received generous 
food and energy subsidies. Not surprisingly these 
groups have been the most resistant to the various 
post-Khomeini attempts at economic reform. 
Iranian populism's bias towards immediate 
consumption is also consistent with the country's 
traditional preference for short-run optimization as 
opposed to longer term growth. As Homa Katouzian 
has observed: 10 
Iran was a short-term society in contrast to 
Europe's long-term society. It was a society 
in which change - even important and 
fundamental change - tended to be a short-
term phenomenon. This was precisely due to 
the absence of an established and inviolable 
legal framework ·which would guarantee 
long-term continuity ..... it rendered very 
difficult cumulative change in the long term, 
including the long-term accumulation of 
property, wealth, capital social and private 
institutions, even the institutions of learning. 
These normally proceeded or existed 
in every short term, but they had to be 
reconstructed or drastically altered in the 
following short terms. 
In sum, Iran's short-term society and massive oil 
revenues together with religious fervor has combined 
to produce a unique style of petro-populism. Iranian 
populist economics introduced by Ayatollah Khomeini 
resembled classical populism in the sense that it 
favored government intervention in the marketplace 
and the protection of workers. It also led to policies 
of cheap food and energy through massive subsidies 
in an attempt to close the standard of living gap 
between the poor and the rich. 
The fact that Iran's initial attempts at populist policies 
did not produce their desired results is well known 
- clearly part of the problem stems from "petro-
populism" itself rather than populism per se. The 
unfortunate fact is that, like Iran, most oil-rich 
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developing countries are underperformers across 
a whole spectrum of economic, social, political 
and governance standards. Large windfall gains 
associated with a rapid increase in oil prices have 
been a particular problem in that they create severe 
distortions in the economy and the political system, 
with strongly negative socio-political consequences. 
In countries as diverse as Iran, Nigeria, Venezuela, 
and Indonesia, the combination of state inefficiency 
and revenue windfalls has proved overwhelming, 
undermining even the best efforts to develop each 
country's non-oil economy, eradicate poverty, and 
improve living standards for broad-based segments 
of the population. 
In Iran's case, no index of economic failure stands out 
as much as the country's chronic high unemployment 
reflects the adaptability of firms and institutions. The 
Fund's measurement of this critical variable shows 
that it was positive and quite high during the 1960-
76 period, contributing between 3.2-4. 7 percent per 
annum to the country's overall growth rate. However, 
after the Revolution, it averaged between -5.5 to -9.6 
percent from 1977-88 and between -1 .8 per cent and 
1.0 percent from 1988-2000. Comparable figures for 
many non-oil developing countries are in the 2.0 to 
3.0 percent range. 
Other obvious factors behind the economic inefficiency 
and stagnant productivity in the post-revolutionary 
period are distortions in prices and subsidies. Annual 
subsidies on fuel, electricity, and basic foodstuffs run 
into billions of dollars, and energy subsidies alone 
account for $15. 7 bn in government expendituresn 
rate. Between 1996 and Total consumer subsidies were 
2000, 693,000 new workers The unfortunate fact is that, like Iran, equivalent to 14 percent of 
entered the labor market, while 
only 296,000 jobs were being 
created. It is estimated that 
unemployment lies somewhere 
between 15 percent and 25 
most oil-rich developing countries 
are underperformers across a whole 
spectrum of economic, social, political 
GDP in 2001/02. 14 The system 
encourages over-consumption 
and waste and a bias toward 
capital-intensive industries. 
Fuel prices are about one-tenth 
and governance standards 
percent, mainly affecting th: young urban population. 
According to the World Bank, the creation of between 
700,000 to 800,000 new jobs each year to achieve 
unemployment rate stability would require an annual 
growth of the economy of at least 6 percent per 
annum. The post-2000 oil boom has not significantly 
reduced the rate of unemployment. 
It has been argued that job creation and improved 
efficiency in Iran's post-revolutionary economy have 
been hindered by the existence of a structural trap 11 , 
whereby political and economic obstacles facilitated 
by oil revenues avert the reallocation of capital from 
low productivity firms to ones that are more productive. 
There is abundant empirical evidence to support this 
explanation. The International Monetary Fund12 has 
found suggestive patterns of total factor productivity 
(TFP), a key indicator of technological change that 
of world prices, and Iran uses about twice as much 
energy per capita as Turkey and Jordan, albeit still 
considerably below the rates of energy use in the 
much more affluent GCC countries. 15 
Just as importantly, oil revenues have, in effect, 
enabled the government to maintain loss-making 
state enterprises (SOEs), which would have been 
impossible for non-oil developing countries. As might 
be expected, the SOEs have not been able to provide 
a dynamic growing job market. During the 1990s, 
about 70 percent of the employment creation in 
Iran was in the private sector, despite the dominant 
contribution of the SOEs in the production of goods 
and services. In addition, Iran's SOEs are typified by 
their lack of fiscal transparency, which has been one of 
the main factors contributing to pervasive corruption, 
and the branding of the Revolution by cynics as just 
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another form of crony capitalism. 
Iran also has a host of semi-autonomous groups, 
associations and organizations with a direct impact on 
the economy that have remained largely unchanged 
over the years, failing to adapt to new economic 
conditions or challenges. Among the most important 
of these economic organizations are the multifaceted 
private religious foundations (bonyads). 
As is well known, charitable foundations enjoy a 
long history of social and communal service and 
promotion of public good in the Muslim world. In 
some countries, they have been put under the direct 
control of a ministry. In others, they function semi-
autonomously but with some degree of government 
supervision. In Iran, these checks are largely absent. 
monopolize widespread areas of trade and business. 
In turn, this has created an environment allowing for 
non-rational and self-interested economic decisions 
and promoted systemic corruption. Because so little 
data on their operations is available, their net effect on 
the economy is hard to quantify, although it can safely 
be assumed that the bonyads, along with the SOEs, 
have had an adverse effect. The bonyads alone control 
25 percent of GDP and enjoy preferential access to 
bank credit, hard currencies, government licenses, 
and lucrative contracts, thus crowding out potentially 
much more efficient private sector activities. 
The chronic losses of these firms require massive 
subsidies from the government. Jn turn, these 
subsidies, along with those for energy and food, are 
The foundations' heads are 
appointed by the supreme 
leader and report to him, 
rather than to the president, 
parliament, or even a minister, 
so that there is no clear system 
of accountability. With the 
supreme leader's approval, they 
Large windfall gains associated with 
a rapid increase in oil prices have 
been a particular problem in that 
they create severe distortions in the 
economy and the political system, 
with strongly negative socio-political 
one of the main reasons for the 
country's chronic budgetary 
deficits and inflationary 
pressures. Apart from the 
expenditure for the Iran-Iraq 
war, to many observers, the 
country's post-1980 excessive 
monetary expansion and 
inflation can be traced directly 
consequences 
control their own economic and 
political decision-making. Periodic attempts by the 
parliament to control these foundations have so far 
been unsuccessful. 
On the positive side, the government has used these 
foundations and their enormous wealth to help the 
poor, as well as victims of the Revolution and the 
Iran-Iraq War. This policy has created an important 
social base of support for the regime and an enduring 
patron-client relationship. The regime can cash in 
and draw support from this large clientele group in 
times of social unrest. On the negative side, with their 
billions of dollars in assets and direct support from 
the supreme leader, strict economic profitability is not 
required, nor are there the normal competitive checks 
on efficiency and productivity. 
The SOEs and bonyads have been allowed to 
back to the government's unwillingness to oppose the 
credit demands of such politically powerful groups. 
Currently inflation is running at 13 percent per annum, 
while unemployment is in the 1 0 percent -11 percent 
range. While the recent increase in oil prices has 
improved the overall fiscal position of the government, 
expanded expenditures (2004/05) resulted in the non-
oil fiscal deficit of the central government reaching a 
nine year high of 19.5 percent of GDP. 16 
The net effect of the government's pervasive price 
controls, excessive subsidies, support of highly 
inefficient state enterprises and bonyads has been to 
keep the country dependent on oil and discourage 
the more productive private modern sector activities 
needed for the country to escape from its structural 
trap. Oil revenues still provide 80 percent of Iran's total 
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exports and 50 percent of total budgetary receipts, and 
the IMF estimates that the country's fiscal and current 
account balances could deteriorate by 0. 75 percent 
and 1.0 percent relative to GDP for every % one 
percent fall in oil prices on average over the medium 
term, making for a precarious economic future. 
2. Ahmadinejad and the 
New Petro-Populism 
As noted earlier, Ahmadinejad campaigned on the 
notion that his two predecessors had neglected the 
principles of a true Islamic state. Specifically he faulted 
the size of the state and its bureaucracy, the budget's 
undue reliance on oil export income, wealth and 
income differentials, low wages, high unemployment, 
corruption, nepotism and monopolies. He promised 
to "put the oil money on everyone's dinner table" by a 
wholesale purification of the Oil Ministry, confiscation 
of government assets obtained through privatizations, 
distribution of "justice shares" to the masses, and 
setting up special funds to offer no- or low-interest 
loans to young couples seeking employment, 
marriage and home ownership. 17 
No doubt, Ahmadinejad'S campaign promises 
that Iran's oil revenues would end up on Iranians' 
tables, contributed greatly to his winning the 2005 
presidential election. Since more than half of the 
people who voted for him reportedly did so for purely 
economic reasons, his success or failure in delivering 
on promises on employment creation, poverty 
eradication, fairer distribution of income and wealth, 
and measures against corruption and discrimination 
are likely, in addition to the nuclear issue, to define his 
presidency. 
To address these issues, Ahmadinejad presented 
(on August 17, 2005) the Iranian Parliament (Maj/is) 
his economic plan in the form of a series of main 
objectives to be met through the implementation of 
58 specific strategies and policies. His nine main 
goals - enumerated without any particular priority or 
sequence - include: 18 
1. Self-reliance in national production and output: 
2. Activation of the nation's total economic capacities 
and potential; 
3. Export promotion; 
4. Equitable distribution of wealth and income; 
5. Employment creation; 
6. Empowerment of the disadvantaged; 
7. Removal of discrimination; 
8. Improving people's purchasing power; and 
9. Higher social welfare. 
Of his 58 policies and programs, 12 appear to be 
central to his approach towards the economy: 
1 . Improving the economy's international competitive-
ness through higher efficiency in all economic 
factors of production. 
2. Achieving self-sufficiency in basic consumer goods. 
3. Targeting subsidies at those in the poorer social 
strata. 
4. Reducing inflation (and bank loan rates) along with 
more efficient distribution of goods and seNices in 
order to increase people's purchasing power. 
5. Rationalising energy consumption. 
6. Protecting domestic industries in a 'rational' manner. 
7. Ensuring investment security, and protecting 
investments through monetary reforms and 
strengthening of the stock market. 
8. Reforming the fiscal sector (reducing public 
expenditure, improving the budget process, 
lowering dependence on oil income, better tax 
collection). 
9. Ending private monopolies and special privileges, 
and guaranteeing equality of opportunity for all. 
10. Fighting corruption and underground economic 
activities. 
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11 . Conducting foreign economic policies (including 
all commercial contracts with foreign firms) within 
the context of the level and quality of diplomatic 
relations with the country in question. 
12. Promoting tourism. 
Like many populist programs, in Ahmadinejad's pro-
gram individual components often sound reasonable 
and well-intended. Yet, upon closer examination, one 
often finds a number of inconsistencies and several 
contradictions stand out: 19 
· While improvement in international competitive-
ness tops the list of economic objectives, self-re-
liance in national output, self-sufficiency in con-
sumer staples, and protection of domestic indus-
tries are also important objectives. 
· On the one hand, Ahmadinejad appears to be 
attempting to shift the government towards bu-
reaucratic downsizing. On the other hand, state 
controls, regulation, and protective measures in 
various economic sectors - particularly agricul-
ture, small industries, handicrafts, and 'deprived 
regions' - also feature prominently. 
· The program notes the necessity of strengthening 
the domestic capital market in order to increase 
private investment. At the same time Ahmadinejad 
has noted that "as long as banks are allowed to 
operate as profit-making institutions, there is no 
hope for a thriving national production." 
· While note is made of the necessity of targeting 
subsidies, rationalising energy consumption, and 
value-added taxation all involve comprehensive 
deregulation and price liberalization, Ahmadinejad 
or his hard-line supporters have shown little en-
thusiasm in pursuing these goals. 
· Private monopolies are, in many cases, the 
source of income for the new president's individual 
or institutional backers. 
· Tourism is to be enhanced as a strong potential 
foreign exchange earner. However, Islamic moral 
424~ 
codes are to be more forcefully enforced on all for-
eign tourists. 
In sum, while no one expected his administration 
to solve Iran's endemic economic problems of high 
unemployment, double-digit inflation and low overall 
factor productivity in a short time span, his approach 
has not inspired confidence. In an open letter to him 
in June, 50 leading Iranian economists described 
his economic strategy as devoid of "expertise and 
scientific basis."20 Perhaps as a result, the country's 
economic progress throughout 2006 has not lived up 
to its potential. 21 
At the macroeconomic level, despite record high oil 
export receipts of nearly $45 billion in 2005 and $55 
billion expected this year, none of the main economic 
indicators has shown progress: 
· GDP growth of about 5.3 percent to 5.5 percent 
this year and last year is far below the targeted 8.0 
percent in the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan 
(2005-10). 
· The official unemployment rate - huge underesti-
mate - has risen to 12 .4 percent. 
· Private economists also question the official 
consumer price index figure of 12.1 percent -
down slightly from the previous year - estimating 
it to be nearer 20 percent. 
· The record $41 billion of imports in 2005 not 
only make Iran the most subsidized economy in 
the region but also damage domestic industrial 
production, creating 40 percent idle capacity. 
Monetary policy: High bank loan interest rates have 
received most of Ahmadinejad's attention. However, 
the results have been unsatisfactory. 
· Ignoring both the 1982 Banking Act and 
international banking practice, and disregarding 
double-digit inflation, the Council on Monetary 
Policy and Credit has ordered both state and 
private banks to lower their lending rates from 16-
24 percent to 14 percent for state banks and 17 
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percent for private banks. 
· Rates paid to depositors have been ordered to 
be cut to 7 -16 percent. 
· As expected, state banks facing lower incomes 
have reduced a good part of their services to cus-
tomers, and private banks have refused to grant 
new loans. New deposits in state banks have 
lagged behind fresh loans. 
· Given the exorbitant rates prevailing in the 'in-
formal' money market (the bazaar and the under-
ground economy) of 30-40 percent, depositors 
have shifted to other opportunities, as evidenced 
by sudden price rises in gold, foreign exchange, 
cell phone permits and other informal outlets. 
· Influential borrowers from 
ciety, establishment of the Imam Reza Love Fund 
to lend money to young people for marriage and 
home ownership, and a fund to finance "quick 
start" employment projects are fraught with practi-
cal weaknesses and are meeting fierce opposition 
from vested interests. 
Conclusion 
Ahmadinejad views Iran's protracted economic prob-
lems as rooted in the skewed distribution of wealth and 
income. He is convinced these socio-economic short-
comings can be effectively remedied with a compas-
sionate and social justice-oriented government pro-
gram. However, despite its crowd-pleasing tone and 
state banks have, in turn, 
made a profit by divert-
ing low-interest borrowed 
funds from promised proj-
... Iran's economic linkages with the GCC 
countries will depend critically on how the 
Iranian government responds to growing 
tenor, Ahmadinejad's populist 
economic agenda provides nei-
ther a solution to Iran's eco-
nomic woes, nor an assurance 
of its people's medium-term 
economic welfare. Nearly all ects to the informal market 
internal discontent over its policies 
for lending to speculators and others at higher 
rates. 
There has been no notable progress in implementing 
other campaign promises: 
· The size of the government, instead of shrinking, 
has expanded as the two supplemental budgets 
in 2005, and 27 percent larger 2006 budget at-
test. 
· There has been no progress against corruption 
or nepotism. On the contrary, the wholesale dis-
missals of experienced managers of state banks 
and industrial enterprises and their replacement 
by the relatives of the new cabinet members has 
negated the promised pursuit of meritocracy. 
· A reduction in petrol imports, which cost about 
$6 billion, or some 12 percent of total crude oil 
export revenues, now looks unlikely. 22 
· Ahmadinejad's plans for the distribution of public 
enterprise shares among the lowest strata in so-
Gulf Research Center 
the targets of his critical focus are systemic, and in-
separable parts of the Islamic Republic's politico-eco-
nomic order. None can be dealt with decisively without 
a wholesale restructuring of the Iranian political econ-
omy. Unfortunately petro-populism addresses only the 
symptoms, not the underlying structural causes of the 
country's economic maladies. 
Specifically, instead of a comprehensive approach 
to Iran's economic difficulties, petro-populism 
has featured frequent, hurried and uncoordinated 
state interventions in the market for goods, money 
and capital, along with the pursuit of expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies. This approach does 
not augur well for a thriving economy in the rest of 
Ahmadinejad's term. These policies, if continued, 
are also bound to fail by a wide margin to deliver his 
promised 'just' Islamic society during his tenure. 
The widespread realization of this has resulted 
in a fairly dramatic fall in his domestic popularity 
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with up to 65 percent of Iranians unhappy with his 
performance. 23 The recent local municipal council 
elections -(December 15, 2006) represented a clear 
rebuke for failing to deliver on promises to improve 
Endnotes 
the economy. 24 Clearly, Iran's economic linkages with 
the GCC countries will depend critically on how the 
Iranian government responds to growing internal 
discontent over its policies. 
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